What was spent, and what was built

Since 2009 the US Department of Energy has invested $1.1 billion in 11 carbon-capture demonstration projects at coal plants and industrial facilities. Of the eight coal projects, seven were not built. The Government Accountability Office attributes that mainly to economics: cheaper natural gas, and uncertainty about carbon markets, which weakened the case for coal plants with capture equipment. One coal facility was built and later halted operations in 2020. The industrial projects fared better than the coal ones. The lesson is not that capture is impossible. It is that programme spending is not the same thing as a plant that operates.

The current wave

The current wave is larger. The International Energy Agency reports more than 30 final investment decisions in the two years to early 2026, and says annual investment grew more than fifteenfold from 2020 to over $5 billion in 2025. Capture capacity under construction is on track to nearly double operating capacity by 2030.

The same report is plain about what has not changed. Permanently stored carbon dioxide has little value on its own. Capture, transport and storage have to work as one chain, and long-term liability for stored CO₂ still has to be allocated. Around 90% of projects announced for 2035 have not reached a final investment decision, and some have already been cancelled or withdrawn from tenders. In one Danish auction, 80% of industrial bidders withdrew after cross-chain risks could not be managed.

Carbon pricing has become more established around this. The World Bank counts 87 implemented direct carbon-pricing policies, covering just over 29% of global greenhouse-gas emissions. Those policies raised over $107 billion for public budgets in 2025, up from below $30 billion in 2016. Coverage and prices remain uneven. A carbon price can support a revenue case. It does not, by itself, make a project bankable.

Bankability still depends on a contracted revenue, a complete chain of assets, a counterparty who can pay, a way to share risk, and a timetable that survives permitting and construction. Where those are missing, development spending can accumulate without a corresponding asset. That is the distinction worth keeping through 2027, in carbon capture and in other capital-intensive systems.

Sources

US Government Accountability Office, Carbon Capture and Storage: Actions Needed to Improve DOE Management of Demonstration Projects, GAO-22-105111. $1.1 billion across 11 projects since 2009. Seven of eight coal projects were not built, largely for economic reasons.
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-105111

IEA, Financing CCUS at Scale, executive summary, 30 March 2026. More than 30 final investment decisions in two years. Investment more than fifteenfold since 2020, to over $5 billion in 2025. About 90% of projects announced for 2035 not yet at final investment decision. Stored CO₂ has little intrinsic market value.
https://www.iea.org/reports/financing-ccus-at-scale/executive-summary

World Bank, State and Trends of Carbon Pricing 2026, 19 May 2026. 87 policies. Just over 29% of global emissions covered. Over $107 billion of public revenue in 2025, from below $30 billion in 2016.
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2026/05/19/direct-carbon-pricing-covers-nearly-one-third-of-global-emissions